Two of these sole criteria are liberty and safety: safety, both generally and for people who fall into groups considered especially vulnerable by those arguing for their protection. When taken as sole criteria the positions become irreconcilable, but there is no reason to treat any criterion as the only thing that matters. Indeed, without liberty, can anyone be truly safe, since a person who is not free is unable to escape danger from those in control? Not all dictatorships are benevolent.

Liberty, then, appears to be a pre-requisite for safety, and it is then tempting to view it as an absolute principle, which raises another problem, for we can see from a simple thought experiment why total liberty cannot exist.

If I am fully free I should be able to do anything I like irrespective of the consequences, but that can only happen if I am the only person in the world. Indeed, even in that case, a foolish action could rapidly terminate my liberty if it ended my ability to act freely by injury or death. With companions in the world it must be clear my liberty cannot extend to restricting that of someone else. If I am fully free you cannot be, for I am free to imprison you or coerce you, and if you are fully free I cannot be, for I must then submit to your freedom when it impacts my own.

A reasonable aspiration therefore cannot be absolute liberty, but the maximum liberty for all compatible with the welfare of all, and that is where fine judgement must come into play, for the precise balance where maximum liberty for all can be achieved or how that liberty can be sustained and whether harm is done by its exercise is not easily defined, as liberty, sustainability, and welfare come in different forms and people will differ on which forms carry more weight. There is no simple objective test which can easily be applied. There must therefore be limits to liberty in order to ensure maximum liberty for all. Thus, a free society cannot be anarchic. It will need rules to protect liberty by constraining harmful liberty and ensure liberty cannot be exercised to the extent it will reduce rather than extend overall liberty. How, then, are we to devise rules which have that effect?

A starting point might be to devise a specification for the purpose of such rules. Specification is the starting point for all good design, sometimes summed up in the dictum “Form follows Function”. We cannot devise rules until we have a clear requirement the rules should achieve. Also, having such a requirement will provide a yardstick against which the performance of rules can be measured.

If we take the aspiration stated above; “the maximum liberty for all compatible with the welfare of all”, we can specify the purpose of the rules as maximising overall liberty without doing harm. This implies two tests: Does the rule maximise liberty for the population as a whole, and does it cause any harm? If we consider liberty in its fullest range of meaning we could see harm to people as a further restriction to their liberty, and harm to their surroundings as a threat to their future liberty. After all, a degraded environment reduces future generations’ options for enjoyment, even if it is only enjoyment of a view or interacting with nature. In that sense, we could see liberty in its broadest definition as encompassing the full potential of human and natural living. The distinction between liberty and welfare can then be dissolved and with it the apparent opposition between the two.

We can now begin to flesh out the criteria the rules need to fulfil. Generally, people should be free to do anything they like unless it impacts the corresponding freedom of somebody else, present or future. When such a conflict arises, freedom should be limited to the extent necessary to equalise the freedom of interested parties, and no more. Defining other interested parties is where things then become interesting and questions arise about how far that definition extends. They must include other people, for there is no obvious reason to favour one person over another, but the argument above implies they could extend to non-human creatures, the natural environment, future generations, history and heritage, opportunities for knowledge and discovery, institutions and, potentially, any other identifiable concept known or unknown.

We can see the rules will always be open to challenge as to whether they go far enough or too far in a particular direction. This is the stuff of political debate and such debate is a legitimate activity, for establishing the boundaries of freedom is both important and open to question. It is as important as freedom itself and as open as due consideration requires.

However, we now have a principle to guide us; freedom should extend until, in impacting that of others, the constraint on the freedom of one imposed by that boundary equals the constraint of the other. Rules and laws should be aimed at achieving that balance and judged against it. If they fail that test, they should be open to question so they can be revised to correct the position.

The purpose of laws is to lay down the limits of liberty for citizens and thus restrain bad behaviour. As such, laws operate where liberty ceases and ought to define the limit at a legitimate point. Laws which prevent citizens doing things which harm no one would be excessive and laws which permit others to be harmed would be insufficient. Difficulty occurs when there is doubt over what constitutes harm or an infringement of someone’s liberty.

A current example is the use of law to enforce Identity Politics, as the current Equality Act does. Without going into detail on that specific Act (which I am not qualified to do) the issue here is that discrimination on certain grounds is seen as harmful and banned and those grounds are defined in terms of current Identity Politics.

However, the definition of discrimination and harm is where controversy arises. For one side, even seeking to debate the categories and establish the boundaries of such debate is claimed as harm, and for the other, Free Speech is seen as a vital reason for doing so. One side seeks law which prevents people disagreeing with them or challenging their assumptions and the other often responds with ridicule. In extreme cases, both sides claim victimisation and that the other are seeking something approaching martyrdom to manipulate the position.

What is lost in such exchanges (usually felt only when one side seeks to impose its will on another) is the proper limit of liberty; any assessment of what is truly legitimate and how such matters should be discussed calmly. Generally, applying the principle established above should show possible ways through. It might be legitimate for people to view themselves in a certain way and to claim common bonds with others who share their view, but it should not be considered legitimate to demand others agree with them. Issues should be resolved by argument, not demands for others to submit. If I am free to believe something, others are free not to do so. If I want to persuade them I can present a case, but I shouldn’t expect them simply to give in. Nor am I entitled to coerce others, for that infringes their own liberty and enforcement might even harm them. We are all entitled to an opinion, but we are not entitled to turn that opinion itself into a right so others are denied the opportunity to disagree. Opinions themselves are not rights, though opinions may claim rights about which others would argue. My opinion does not entitle me to control other people or to require them to behave as I would want. That would infringe their rights. My understanding of the world should not dictate how others see it, or even how they see me. They are entitled to their own view, to be themselves, and not extensions of my identity.

Alongside liberty, there is also a need for honesty. It is difficult to argue seriously if one side is dishonest, manipulating data or making false allegations. For example, in the Spring of 2023, the Labour Party claimed Rishi Sunak did not believe people who assaulted children should go to prison because judges had not always imposed long custodial sentences. This was mischievous because the Labour Party knew, in a free democracy, Government does not control individual judicial decisions, yet blamed the Prime Minister personally because judges do not always do what is politically expedient. Such dishonest deceptions undermine liberty because they reduce people’s ability to exercise the scrutiny which protects it. Evaluation of an issue and debate depends on honestly recognising arguments and counter-arguments and responding appropriately. Justice, which also protects people from false allegations which threaten their liberty, depends on truth and truth depends on honesty. Hence, liberty does not extend to freedom to deceive under the guise of Free Speech. Genuine Free Speech should at least aim to be truthful and deliberate falsehood should not be considered acceptable as Free Speech because it undermines liberty rather than promoting it. That said, the remedy is not to silence speech deemed to be false, but to examine through an honest and reliable process to establish truth or falsehood. Only then should an appropriate censure be applied and a full explanation and correction published.

So, Liberty has legitimate limits which, in an apparent irony, need to be accepted if it is to be maximised. This used to be well recognised in the UK and it is strange that in recent decades that recognition appears less accepted than it once was. It might seem strange to those to whom the idea is new, but I believe the foregoing arguments demonstrate how maximum liberty is not the same thing as absolute liberty, and is actually a balance of liberty and protection of that liberty through recognising its inherent limitations.